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Innocent Abroad? Morrison, Vilar, and the
Extraterritorial Application of the Exchange Act
During the fall of 1919, two American sailors bound for Rio de Janeiro
hatched a plan to defraud the United States government.' When their
scheme-which involved an unscrupulous Standard Oil agent, a Rio-based
shipbuilder, and a large quantity of fuel-came to the attention of American
authorities, the sailors offered a simple defense: since their crimes were
committed on the high seas, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, they were presumptively beyond the reach of American law.
Unfortunately for the conspirators, the Supreme Court did not agree.
Instead, in United States v. Bowman, the Court held that some criminal statutes
"are, as a class, not logically dependent upon their locality for the
Government's jurisdiction," and are therefore presumed to apply
extraterritorially even if they contain no explicit indication to that effect.3 The
Bowman decision was remarkable: in most contexts, courts assume that
ambiguous statutes do not have extraterritorial application.4 Yet Bowman's
exception to the general rule, which many subsequent courts chose to read as a
broad carve-out for all criminal statutes,5 has proven highly influential. It
helped give rise to a comparatively liberal approach to the extraterritorial
application of criminal law that has endured for decades.6
1. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 95-96 (1922).
2. Id. at 96-97.
3. Id. at 98.
4. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION app. 34 & -1.58
(4th ed. 2007).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700 (2d Cit. 2012) ("The ordinary
presumption that laws do not apply extraterritorially has no application to criminal
statutes.").
6. See Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAw & POL'Y
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Some eighty-eight years after Bowman, though, the Supreme Court handed
down another landmark ruling that seemed to question the presumptive
extraterritorial application of criminal statutes. In Morrison v. National Australia
Bank,7 the Court significantly limited the extraterritorial reach of section io(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, holding that this provision only barred
frauds committed in connection with domestic securities transactions.' Since
section io(b) covers both civil and criminal violations, the Court's reasoning,
which relied heavily on the principle that "[w]hen a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none,"9 potentially implied
that criminal statutes were not exempt from the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Yet Morrison did not make this point explicit. Its holding-
which arose from a shareholder lawsuit brought against an Australian bank by
Australian investors-only directly addressed "whether § io(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs
suing foreign and American defendants."o The opinion therefore left a
question of tremendous importance unanswered: Did its narrow reading of the
Exchange Act's reach apply to criminal violations of section io(b) as well? Or
did Bowman, and the corresponding tradition of construing criminal statutes to
permit extraterritorial enforcement, limit Morrison's approach to civil actions?
In August 2013, the Second Circuit offered a definitive answer: "Morrison
does apply to criminal cases."" In its opinion in United States v. Vilar, the court
roundly rebuffed the government's assertion that Bowman confined Morrison's
presumption against extraterritoriality to civil contexts. While noting that
some opinions interpreting Bowman had been "broadly worded," Vilar
returned to a narrow reading of the ninety-year-old decision, restricting its
carve-out to crimes committed against the United States itself." Even more
significantly, the Second Circuit rebuked the government for providing "little
reason, beyond its misplaced reliance on Bowman, for why the presumption
INT'L Bus. 1, 51-54 (1992) ("In the wake of Bowman . . . lower federal courts fashioned a
variety of important exceptions to the territoriality presumption in criminal cases.").
7. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
8. Id. at 2888. Specifically, Morrison establishes a "transactional test," id. at 2886, that defines
section lo(b)'s reach in terms of where a fraudulent transaction takes place. According to the
opinion, "Section io(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock
exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States." Id. at 2888.
9. Id. at 2878.
io. Id. at 2875.
ii. United States v. Vilar, 729 F. 3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2013).




against extraterritoriality should not apply to criminal statutes." 13 There was
simply "no reason," the court argued, why the justifications for the
presumption -which it identified as a belief that Congress "legislates with
domestic concerns in mind" and a reluctance to create conflicts with foreign
laws -were any "less pertinent in the criminal context."14
Vilar has far-reaching implications for a world in which financial markets,
and the enforcement actions that police them, have grown increasingly
transnational.s The Second Circuit's decision strips the government of its
ability to prosecute overseas securities frauds -including those committed
against American citizens-and therefore poses a major impediment to
regulators. This Comment argues that the court should have taken a different
approach. While the Second Circuit rightly concluded that nothing about the
substance of criminal law renders the presumption against extraterritoriality
inapplicable in criminal contexts, it ignored a related -and far more relevant -
distinction between the civil shareholder suit evaluated in Morrison and the
criminal fraud prosecution in Vilar: the identity of the party bringing the case.
There are good reasons to believe that the justifications underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality are, indeed, "less pertinent" when the
party bringing an action is the United States government rather than a private
individual -no matter whether that action is criminal or civil. This Comment
accordingly argues that it would be wise to limit Morrison to its facts, reading
the case to apply to private lawsuits but not government enforcement actions.
This approach would ensure an effective regulatory regime that avoided
unnecessary conflicts with foreign laws and faithfully effectuated congressional
intent.
I. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL OR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE?
Vilar astutely observed that the substantive interests protected by civil and
criminal statutes provide "no reason" to apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality to one but not the other."' After all, the government's
asserted rationale for extraterritorial criminal application- that criminal fraud
13. Id. at 74.
14. Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n-5 (1993)).
15. See Carl H. Loewenson, Jr. et al., The Second Circuit Speaks: The Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality Applies to Criminal Prosecutions, MORRISON FOERSTER (Sept.
3, 2013), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/130903-The-Presumption-Against
-Extraterritoriality-Applies-to-Criminal-Prosecutions.pdf.
16. Vilar, 729 F.3d at 74.
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statutes "are concerned with prohibiting individuals . . . from defrauding
American investors"17 -holds with equal force in the civil context. Just as
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to criminal statutes creates
"broad immunity for criminal conduct simply because the fraudulent scheme
culminates in a purchase or sale abroad,"" so too does applying the
presumption to civil statutes create broad immunity for civil frauds that take
place overseas. 9
However, the Vilar court's summary dismissal of restrictions on the
presumption against extraterritoriality ignored a more powerful argument for
distinguishing between the shareholder lawsuit addressed in Morrison on the
one hand, and a criminal fraud prosecution on the other. While the action in
Morrison was brought by private plaintiffs (Australian ones, no less), the Vilar
case was filed by the executive branch of the United States government.
Unlike a distinction between criminal and civil statutes-which, as the
Second Circuit noted, is supported by little more than courts' historical
willingness to apply criminal statutes extraterritorially- a distinction between
public and private plaintiffs rests on solid theoretical footing because it cuts to
the heart of why courts apply the presumption against extraterritoriality in the
first place. While the presumption could be seen as nothing more than a
background assumption against which Congress can legislate, this approach is
unsatisfying.20 The choice of statutory interpretation defaults has
consequences, and therefore the selection of one possible baseline (e.g., no
extraterritorial application) over another (e.g., universal extraterritorial
application) requires some justification.' Indeed, judges and scholars have
long provided a variety of reasons for selecting no extraterritorial application as
the starting point for interpretation.' EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., a
quintessential modern statement of the presumption against
17. Brief for the United States at 98, Vilar, 729 F.3d 62 (No. 1o-521-cr(L)).
18. Id. at 99.
ig. See Vilar, 729 F.3d at 74.
20. See WILUAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 277 (1994).
21. Id. at 279 ("The canon against extraterritorial application of United States law systematically
advantages transnational companies, for example. Because the default rule is that there is no
extraterritorial application, the burden of inertia is on those who want the statute to apply
extraterritorially .... [These consequences] require normative justification.").
22. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 90 (1998) (identifying six different potential justifications for the
presumption against extraterritoriality that have been offered by courts and commentators,
but arguing that only one, the "notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic




extraterritoriality, 3 grounds the canon in a belief that Congress "is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions,"2 and a desire to avoid the "international
discord" that could arise from clashes between American and foreign law.25 If
the presumption against extraterritoriality rests on these grounds, then it
should extend only as far they do.26
Yet, as Vilar demonstrates, these justifications founder when the
presumption is used to block public enforcement actions rather than private
suits. In keeping with the Supreme Court's extraterritoriality jurisprudence,
Vilar laid out two reasons for adhering to the presumption against
extraterritoriality: "because the presumption 'serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could
result in international discord,'"2 7 and "because we understand that 'Congress
generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.'"12' Both -particularly the
first -apply with far less force when the party bringing an action is the federal
government.
Extraterritorial public enforcement poses a considerably smaller threat to
international comity than extraterritorial private rights of action do. As courts
and commentators have noted, "private plaintiffs often are unwilling to
exercise the degree of self-restraint and consideration of foreign governmental
sensibilities generally exercised by the U.S. Government." While private
plaintiffs have little incentive to consider the broad foreign policy goals of the
federal government before deciding whether to pursue a suit, components of
the executive branch can and do take such matters into account.3o As a result,
23. See, e.g., id. at 91 (describing the modern presumption against extraterritoriality as the
"Aramco Presumption" and stating that the case "breathed new life into the presumption").
24. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
25. Id.
26. Gary Born, for example, argues that the presumption against extraterritoriality should be
abandoned because the rationales for implementing the canon have become obsolete. Born,
supra note 6, at 1. This Comment makes a similar, but narrower, point solely with regard to
the extraterritorial application of statutes giving rise to public enforcement.
27. United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013)).
28. Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)).
29. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 171 (2004) (quoting Joseph P.
Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 194
(1999))-
30. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 26, Morrison v.
Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191) [hereinafter Brief for the
United States] (noting that the SEC "routinely works with its overseas counterparts to
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insofar as the presumption against extraterritoriality stems from a desire to
avoid international conflicts, it should apply far more vigorously to statutory
provisions granting private rights of action.3'
Structural considerations also favor allowing the executive branch-the
"sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations"32-
to determine when the balance of interests supports enforcing a particular U.S.
law overseas. The presumption against extraterritoriality is often presented as a
form of judicial modesty, stemming from courts' reticence to "run interference
in such a delicate field of international relations."33 Yet while judges may be
institutionally ill-equipped to determine whether to apply statutes
extraterritorially, executive actors have precisely the sort of competence
required to make such determinations.3 As a result, it seems reasonable for
develop coordinated approaches to enforcement"). This argument might seem problematic
in light of the fact that the SEC is an independent agency (though the objection is somewhat
softened by the fact that criminal securities prosecutions are brought by the Department of
Justice, which is not). However, there is considerable evidence that the Commission pays
attention to international comity when bringing enforcement actions in spite of its
independence. Empirical studies have found that that the SEC has historically been reluctant
to enforce American securities laws against foreign companies listed in the United States
without cooperation from foreign regulatory authorities. See Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign
Finns Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities Laws?, 75 J. FIN. EcoN. 319, 349
(2005) ("[T]he SEC has not been able and/or willing to be the world's governance
enforcement agency. The commission ... relies on the case-by-case cooperation of foreign
law enforcement agencies."); see also David Ruder, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the Lecture
Program of the School of Business Administration at the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee: Internationalization of Securities Markets 18 (Sept. 26, 1988),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1988/o92688ruder.pdf (noting that the SEC's response to
the globalization of securities markets "has been to develop international surveillance and
information sharing arrangements that are effective from an enforcement standpoint while
sensitive to national sovereignty concerns").
31. See Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal Law
After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 137, 186-88 (2011).
In a related example, courts have been far more willing to permit extraterritorial antitrust
prosecutions than extraterritorial private antitrust suits. See Developments in the Law-
Extraterritoriality, 124 HARv. L. REV. 1269, 1279 (2011).
32. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
33. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957); see also Curtis A. Bradley,
Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649, 694 (2000) ("[I]nstitutional
concerns may explain why courts should apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality .... But this explanation does not weigh against giving Chevron deference
to an extraterritorial interpretation by the executive branch.").
34. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1170, 1205 (2007) ("[T]he executive branch is in a better position to understand the benefits




courts to defer to the executive's judgment of whether a particular law should
be enforced abroad.35
This logic of deference speaks most directly to the Second Circuit's first
rationale for the presumption against extraterritoriality- the desire to avoid
international conflict-but to some degree it also undermines the second. A
presumption that Congress "legislates with domestic concerns in mind" has
little content absent a specification of what types of concerns count as
"domestic." Is a fraud committed against an American citizen by an overseas
con-man, for example, a "domestic concern" or not?3' By advocating for the
extraterritorial enforcement of a law, the executive is effectively offering its
opinion on the answer to this question. It seems reasonable, in line with
accepted principles of deference, for courts to take this guidance into account.37
II. MORRISON AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE EXCHANGE ACT
The distinction between public and private plaintiffs is particularly
apposite to securities regulation.35 Indeed, a proper understanding of the
3s. See id. at 1228 (arguing that because "the executive is in the best position to make the
appropriate consequentialist judgments" regarding whether to apply a statute
extraterritorially, "courts should defer to executive interpretations").
36. See Dodge, supra note 22, at 119 ("To say that Congress is 'primarily concerned with
domestic conditions,' then, is really to say that Congress is primarily concerned with
conduct that causes effects in the United States." (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991))).
37. See Clopton, supra note 31, at 188 (suggesting that courts should defer to executive
judgments on whether extraterritorial conduct falls within the ambit of a statute because
"the executive is in a better position to effectuate congressional intent").
38. In fact, securities law has long been characterized by differential approaches to public and
private enforcement. Private rights of action under section io(b) are implied, whereas public
enforcement authority is explicit. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,
2881 n.5 (2010) ("[T]he implied private cause of action under § lo(b) and Rule lob-5 is a
thing of our own creation . . . ."). Accordingly, private plaintiffs looking to recover under
section io(b) bear the burden of proving a variety of elements that public enforcers need not
demonstrate, such as reliance, economic loss, and loss causation. See United States v. Vilar,
729 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 2013). It is important, however, not to overstate the implications of
this general willingness to treat private and public securities suits differently. Courts have
often distinguished between the conduct prohibited by section 1o(b), which is the same for
both public and private actions, and what must be shown in court to recover under section
io(b) or Rule lob-5, which is not. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 172 (1994) ("In our cases addressing § io(b) and Rule iob-5, we
have confronted two main issues. First, we have determined the scope of conduct prohibited
by § lo(b). Second, in cases where the defendant has committed a violation of § lo(b), we
have decided questions about the elements of the 1ob-5 private liability scheme . . . ."
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context surrounding Morrison reveals the extent to which the case specifically
responded to concerns over aggressive private, rather than public, securities
litigation.
Morrison emerged from a climate of frustration over the proliferation of "f-
cubed" actions -shareholder lawsuits in U.S. courts brought by foreign
plaintiffs against foreign defendants over foreign securities transactions.3 9
Morrison was itself an f-cubed action involving a class of Australian citizens
who brought suit against National Australia Bank as shareholders of the bank's
Australia-issued securities. As Justice Ginsburg aptly observed during oral
arguments,.the case "has 'Australia' written all over it."40
The Court's opinion reflected its desire to limit this type of problematic
shareholder litigation. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia cited several
commentators who had catalogued the drawbacks of f-cubed actions,41 and
noted widespread concern that America had "become the Shangri-La of class-
action litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign
securities markets."42
In particular, the Court seemed troubled by the effects of aggressive
shareholder litigation on international comity. A number of foreign
governments and international organizations filed amicus briefs in Morrison,
and their pleas had a significant impact on the Court's reasoning:
The Commonwealth of Australia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the Republic of France have filed amicus
briefs in this case. So have (separately or jointly) such international and
(internal citations omitted)). While courts have considerable flexibility to modify the
elements of private iob-5 liability, "when it comes to the scope of the conduct prohibited by
Rule lob-5 and 5 io(b), the text of the statute controls our decision." Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at
2881 n.5 (internal punctuation omitted).
39. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law:
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 14 (2007); Stephen J. Choi
& Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits,
2009 Wis. L. REV. 465, 466.
40. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. o8-1191).
41. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880 (citing Choi & Silberman, supra note 39, at 467-68); id. at
2886 (citing Buxbaum, supra note 39, at 38-41). Justice Scalia specifically cited Choi and
Silberman for the proposition that application of section io(b) had been "unpredictable and
inconsistent" rather than for the proposition that f-cubed actions create problematic
consequences, id. at 2880, but Choi and Silberman's entire discussion of inconsistent
enforcement occurs in the context of "how courts in the United States have dealt with the
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws to f-cubed cases," Choi & Silberman, supra
note 39, at 466-67.




foreign organizations as [list of organizations]. They all complain of the
interference with foreign securities regulation that application of
§ lo(b) abroad would produce, and urge the adoption of a clear test
that will avoid that consequence. The transactional test we have
adopted . .. meets that requirement.43
Examining the contentions of these amici helps illuminate the Court's
decision. And every single one stated that its primary concern was private
shareholder actions.44 Australia, for example -the country of origin for both
parties -emphasized that its brief "deals with private suits under § lo(b) and
Rule iob-5 and does not address issues relating to enforcement action by the
SEC under those provisions."45
The Solicitor General felt the same way. In its amicus brief, the
government argued that "SEC enforcement actions are unlikely to produce
conflict with foreign nations .... Private securities actions, in contrast, present
a significant risk of conflict . . . "46
What does all this mean? Justice Stevens more or less summed it up in his
concurrence: "The Court's opinion does not . . . foreclose the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission from bringing enforcement actions in additional
circumstances, as no issue concerning the Commission's authority is presented
by this case."47 As Justice Stevens noted, "The Commission's enforcement
43. Id. at 2885-86.
44. See Brief for Amici Curiae the Institute of International Bankers et al. in Support of
Respondents at 3, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. o8-1191); Brief of the Government of the
Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees at 2,
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191) [hereinafter Brief for Australia]; Brief for the
Republic of France as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3-5, Morrison, 130 S. Ct.
2869 (No. o8-1191); Brief of Amid Curiae the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association et al. in Support of Respondents at 6-7, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191);
Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 2, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. o8-1191). The brief for the
International Chamber of Commerce et al. does acknowledge that its proposed limitation on
section io(b)'s extraterritorial reach would "appl[y] equally to the SEC." Brief for the
International Chamber of Commerce et al. in Support of Respondents at 4, Morrison, 130 S.
Ct. 2879 (No. 08-1191). However, it nonetheless emphasizes that "potential U.S. class action
litigation" -not SEC enforcement- "is chief among the concerns of would-be investors in
the U.S. marketplace," id. at 3, and even explicitly discusses "the difference between the
SEC, cabined by prosecutorial discretion that includes consideration of comity concerns,
and the plaintiffs' securities bar, which has no such check," id. at 34-35.
45. Brief for Australia, supra note 44, at 5.
46. Brief for the United States, supra note 30, at 26-27.
47. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2894 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring). It could be argued that Justice
Stevens missed the point of the majority's holding, which seems to speak in broad terms
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proceedings not only differ from private § lo(b) actions in numerous
potentially relevant respects, but they also pose a lesser threat to international
comity."48 Justice Stevens could have elaborated in greater detail, but it is not
hard to understand his point. Barring extraterritorial public enforcement
actions seriously hamstrings securities regulators in a world where close to
forty percent of American investors hold some foreign assets. 49 Such a
categorical ban is not a reasonable response to concerns over f-cubed actions
and frivolous shareholder suits.
Of course, since Justice Stevens's proposed limitation appears only in a
concurrence, it lacks the force of law, and the Vilar court was not bound to
accept it. But as persuasive authority it is, in combination with all the other
evidence of Morrison's scope, quite powerfil. It seems apparent that Morrison
responded to the particular set of problems posed by private shareholder
litigation. Its precedent should not be stretched beyond the circumstances to
which its reasoning most clearly applies.
III. CONGRESS SPEAKS (CLUMSILY): DODD-FRANK AND THE
PUBLIC/PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT DISTINCTION
In case the distinction between public and private enforcement slipped by
some readers of Morrison, Congress quickly set about clarifying things on its
own. Just days after Morrison was handed down, Congress passed the massive
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.5 In section
about section io(b)'s extraterritorial application rather than draw fine lines between private
and Commission-initiated actions. See, e.g., id. at 2883 (majority opinion) ("In short, there is
no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that § io(b) applies extraterritorially, and we
therefore conclude that it does not."). However, it is not clear that the majority actually
forecloses Justice Stevens's interpretation of its opinion. The Court explicitly notes that its
holding addresses "whether § io(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of
action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection
with securities traded on foreign exchanges," id. at 2876 (emphasis added), suggesting that
its more sweeping statements in other parts of the opinion may be dicta. Furthermore,
Justice Stevens's assertion that the decision did not affect the SEC's enforcement authority
drew no response from the majority, providing additional support for its credibility.
48. Id. at 2894 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
49. Nidi M. Geevarghesese, Note, A Shocking Loss of Investor Protection: The Implications of
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 235, 247 (2011)
(noting that in 2007, thirty-six percent of American investors held foreign securities (citing
Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Divided as to Effect of Foreign Investing on U.S. Economy,
GALLUP (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/polI/26905/public-divided-effect-foreign
-investing-us-economy.aspx)).
So. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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929P, entitled "Strengthening Enforcement by the Commission," the statute
amended the Exchange Act to provide "extraterritorial jurisdiction" for any
"action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the United
States" regarding securities frauds that involved "conduct within the United
States" or "conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable
substantial effect within the United States."s" Congress declined to include
private plaintiffs in this grant, instead recommending in a later section that the
SEC "conduct a study to determine the extent to which private rights of action
... should be extended" to cover extraterritorial transactions.52
In other words, in its post-Morrison legislation, Congress appears to have
drawn precisely the distinction that this Comment proposes. It attempted to
ensure that public enforcement of the securities laws, whether by the SEC or
the Department of Justice, would not be confined to domestic securities
transactions under Morrison's "transactional test." It was more cautious about
private actions.
Dodd-Frank's legislative history reveals that this differentiation was a
considered choice. An earlier draft of section 9 2 9 P extended extraterritorial
jurisdiction to all suits under section io(b), but its language was modified to
refer only to actions brought by the SEC and DOJ in the final version.53 As the
provision's sponsor, Representative Paul Kanjorski, made clear, section 9 29 P
was specifically designed to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality
for public enforcement "by clearly indicating that Congress intends
extraterritorial application in cases brought by the SEC or the Justice
Department."54
In an unfortunate twist, however, this indication turned out to be far less
clear than Kanjorski assumed. The text of section 929 P explicitly addresses
only the "jurisdiction" of federal courts, whereas Morrison established that
section io(b)'s extraterritorial application "is a merits question."s5 As a result,
read literally, this part of Dodd-Frank does nothing more than grant federal
51. Id. § 929P.
s2. Id. § 929Y(a).
53. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 11ith Cong. § 7216 (as
introduced in House, Dec. 2, 2009); see also Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARv. Bus. L.
REV. 195, 201-02 (2011) (noting this change and commenting that the final language was
drafted with the help of the SEC).
54. 156 CONG. REC. H5237 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski).
55. Morrison v. Nat'lAustl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
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courts jurisdiction they already possessed-a fact that many commentators
were quick to note after the bill was signed into law.s'
If section 9 29P expands the substantive reach of section io(b) in spite of
this apparent drafting error-as it might under a generous reading that
emphasized the provision's history and purpose over its plain text - then Vilar's
expansion of Morrison's holding to criminal contexts is clearly misguided. Even
if section 9 29 P is unsalvageable, however, it still could have carried some
weight in the Vilar court's deliberation. Its very existence indicates that
Congress sees an important distinction between public and private
enforcement of section 1o(b) and does not wish to have the former hampered
by strict territorial limitations. This fact cannot be ignored because the
presumption against extraterritoriality is, at its root, an assumption about how
Congress is likely to think.Y Whether and when the presumption accurately
reflects congressional intent is something of an empirical question-one that
the legislative history of section 929P seems to answer in the negative as far as
public enforcement of section io(b) is concerned.
Of course, section 929 P provides more powerful evidence about the
intentions of the iiith Congress, which passed Dodd-Frank in 2010, than
about the desires of the 73rd Congress, which created the Exchange Act in
1934.5 Yet it should still alter our understanding of the '34 Act's meaning. The
Supreme Court has noted that "repeal by implication of a legal disposition
implied by a statutory text" -such as the Court's construction of section 1o(b)
in Morrison -requires a much less clear statement of intent than the repeal of a
statute itself.59 Therefore, a contemporary Congress can provide a new gloss on
old laws even if its legislative actions fall short of formally amending those
S6. See, e.g., Richard Painter et al., When Courts and Congress Don't Say What They Mean, 20
MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (2011); Meny Elgadeh, Note, Morrison v. National Australia Bank:
Life After Dodd-Frank, 16 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 573, 593-94 (2011). In a recent SEC
enforcement action, the Northern District of Illinois suggested that section 9 29 P "merely
addresses subject matter jurisdiction ... rather than the substantive reach of Section io(b)."
SEC v. A Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, No. 13 C 982, 2013 WL 4012638, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
6, 2013).
57. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 (noting that the presumption is not a clear statement rule
and that "context can be consulted as well" to determine whether Congress intends for a
statute to apply extraterritorially); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 15S, 176-77
(1993) (discussing how a range of nontextual sources can inform the Court's understanding
of congressional intent regarding extraterritorial application).
58. Some commentators have, however, suggested that current congressional preferences
should influence the way that courts construe old statutes. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-
Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 2027, 2034 (2002).




laws. The "classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted over time, and
getting them to 'make sense' in combination, necessarily assumes that the
implications of a statute may be altered by the implications of a later statute.""o
As a result, courts should not use the presumption against
extraterritoriality to block public enforcement under section io(b) without
taking Congress's recent attempts to repudiate such an approach into
account."1
CONCLUSION
Vilar extended Morrison further than it should go. While Morrison may
speak in broad terms about the extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act,
it is evident that much of its reasoning responds to specific features of private
shareholder lawsuits that public enforcement actions- including criminal
prosecutions-do not share. In securities law, as in many other areas, the
presumption against extraterritoriality is not nearly as compelling when
applied to public, rather than private, rights of action. The executive branch is
institutionally well-positioned to weigh the consequences of extending law
extraterritorially, and should be given broader leeway than private plaintiffs to
do so. This proposition is especially powerful in light of Congress's recent
attempt to enact it into law in section 929P, however sloppy the effort may
have been. In order to preserve an effective securities regulation regime and
faithfully implement the will of Congress, courts should remove strict
territorial bars to public enforcement of the Exchange Act.
DANIEL E. HERZ-ROIPHE*
6o. Id.; see also Painter et al., supra note 56, at 20 n.84 (suggesting that Congress "implicitly
modified the judicial construction of Section lo(b) as to DOJ and SEC enforcement actions
when it affirmatively introduced statutory indicia of extraterritoriality").
61. One potential criticism of this proposal-which Vilar mentions, see United States v. Vilar,
729 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2013)-is that it would arguably give section io(b) different
meanings in public and private enforcement contexts. However, this is not as problematic as
it might sound. The Supreme Court has noted that the same statutory provision "may take
on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different
implementation strategies." Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 573-74 (2007)
(construing "modification" to have two different meanings in two different contexts in spite
of the fact that the term was defined only once in the relevant statute).
* Many thanks to Alex Metz and the editors of the Yale Law Journal for their invaluable
suggestions, to Justin Anderson for shaping this piece and the law to which it responds, to
John Morley for his dedication and expertise, to Lev Menand for seeing me through a
decade of projects, to my father for everything (quite literally), and to Claire for putting up
with me.
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